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ALICE IN RECIDIVISM LAND: THE QUEENS LOGIC  
AND CHILD PROTECTION WORKERS’ ASSESSMENT  
OF SEXUAL DANGEROUSNESS  
 
Ian R. Coyle, Ph.D., Robert L. Halon, Ph.D., Terence W. Campbell, Ph.D., 
Donald M. Thomson, Ph.D., LL.B., Jessica Woskett 
 
This article is based on a case that highlights the dearth of cogent 
and pertinent risk assessment information in the reports and testimonies 
of many involved in assessing risks to children in real life problematic 
circumstances. In the case, the decision to exclude an intrafamilial sexu-
al offender from the family home was made in large measure on the ba-
sis that the offender’s wife accepted the offender’s “denial of guilt” to ac-
cusations previously made against him. Keeping families apart should 
not be entertained without reliable and valid evidence pointing to that 
decision. However, as will be seen, the evidence often relied upon by 
child protection workers, albeit in good faith, is neither. The assessment 
processes described in the case point directly to what appears to be a 
wider lack of knowledge specific to assessment of recidivism, to misrepre-
sentation of risk assessment information, and to overarching epistemo-
logical issues that appear to be widely ignored and/or misunderstood 
within the overall field of risk assessment and threat management. The 
purpose of this article is to describe how the information used to decide 
upon exclusion in the case cannot be considered probative and to iterate 
the methodological processes that must be considered in such cases if 
miscarriages of justice are to be avoided. 
THE QUEEN’S LOGIC 
“…There’s the King’s Messenger. He’s in prison now, being 
punished: and the trial doesn’t even begin till next Wednesday: 
and of course the crime comes last of all.” “Suppose he never 
commits the crime?” said Alice. “That would be all the better. 
Wouldn’t it?” the Queen said... Alice felt there was no denying 
that. ‘‘Of course it would be all the better,” she said, “but it 
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wouldn’t be all the better his being punished.” “You’re wrong 
there at any rate.’’ said the Queen. “Were you ever punished?” 
“Only for faults” said Alice. “And you were all the better for it, I 
know!” the Queen said triumphantly. “Yes, but then I had done 
the things I was punished for.’’ said Alice. “That makes all the 
difference.” “But if you hadn’t done them,” the Queen said, 
“that would have been better still: better, and better, and bet-
ter!” (Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland) 
The parole period of a father was set to expire. He had been con-
victed of having “consensual” sexual intercourse with his then-15-
year-old stepdaughter who had subsequently returned to live with her 
biological father. The offender had been on parole for two years, dur-
ing which he had met all of his parole conditions and developed a most 
successful business. Three professionals, who were senior in terms of 
qualifications and experience, including the first author of this article, 
had independently assessed the father for release on parole and were in 
agreement that his risk of recidivism was low. Representatives of Child 
Safety Services (CSS), Department of Community Services, Queens-
land, objected to the father returning to reside with his family and, in-
stead, applied for a Court order requiring him to have only third party 
supervised access to his biological children until they attained the age 
of sixteen. That the offender’s wife had recently given birth to their 
latest child made the potential consequences of the CSS application 
profoundly more negative for the offender and his family.  
A few months before the term of father’s full sentence was to ex-
pire, his parole officer—also an employee of the Department of Com-
munity Services—applied for an order prohibiting the father from at-
tending the birth of his latest child on the basis that attending the hos-
pital would pose an unacceptable risk to the newborn. The application 
failed before the Supreme Court of Queensland. Undeterred, the pa-
role officer then filed a formal complaint to Child Safety Services (CSS) 
stating that the father still posed a risk of recidivism, in particular 
against his biological offspring. 
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A social worker at CSS who was junior in terms of qualifications 
and experience became the Applicant to The Court in order to prose-
cute the parole officer’s “high risk”; the contention being that there 
was an unacceptable risk of recidivism on the basis that the offender’s 
wife accepted his denial of guilt. In an Affidavit filed in the Children’s 
Court of Queensland, the social worker initially argued, on an ex parte 
basis, that because the father’s wife believed him to be innocent she 
would not demonstrate adequate “protective factors” and, further, that 
there was considerable scientific justification for her position. Pursu-
ant to a court order arising from the application, another psychologist, 
junior in terms of qualifications though not in experience, then as-
sessed the offender, his wife and children. In a Kafkaesque twist to 
what was already a bizarre case, the psychologist started his assessment 
session with the offender’s wife by showing her a photograph of two 
copulating kangaroos. The psychologist based his overall argument to 
a significant degree around the false idea that denial of risk does pre-
dict recidivism, yet concluded that the offender posed a low risk of re-
cidivism; the “denial raises risk” issue will be discussed in more depth 
later in this article  
Counsel for the respondent father argued, in essence, that the ap-
plicant’s opinions of the father’s risk of recidivism and dangerousness 
to his biological children were ill founded, because they were not sup-
ported by science or other empirical evidence. The court case largely 
involved expert evidence that is of significant moment in proceedings 
of this specific type and generally insofar as the court’s reception of 
expert evidence sought to be adduced by Child Protection Service 
(CPS) workers and other professionals is concerned.  
THE CSS CASE FOR EXCLUDING SEXUAL OFFENDING PARENTS  
FROM THE FAMILY HOME: APPLYING THE QUEEN’S LOGIC 
Despite the lack of empirical evidence to support the risk proposi-
tion or justify “no contact” or “supervised contact” orders, CSS main-
tained there are a number of propositions that underlie their conclu-
sions that such limitations are the best option. That is, even though the 
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decision to exclude an intrafamilial sexual offender from the family 
home, or impose other draconian sanctions such as requiring only su-
pervised contact, may be empirically unfounded, it is, nonetheless, the 
best option. For example, Wilson (1), in harmony with the Queen’s 
logic, noted that such decisions would often be undertaken on the ba-
sis of inadequate information and great urgency: 
“…the fact that an allegation may later prove unfounded 
should not, by itself, dissuade us from using this remedy. These 
error costs are no greater than those that occur when the state 
removes a child who is later found not to have been abused.” 
The basis for this best option argument is, so it is asserted, found 
by considering a number of factors commonly cited by Child Protec-
tive Services workers to justify their risk assessment decisions in such 
cases. The similarity of this basis to circular argument is hard to deny.  
Although the factors said to be commonly cited are not independ-
ent, for convenience they are dealt with in what follows in the order 
that they typically appear in CPS workers’ applications for such ban-
ishment. Sexual Abuse Counselling Services, an organization within 
the Department of Communities, which provides, so it is asserted, in-
dependent advice to CSS in Queensland, routinely cites these factors as 
justification for assigning severity of risk 
CROSS-OVER AND RECIDIVISM IN INTRAFAMILIAL SEX OFFENDERS 
CPS workers often note that the risk of recidivism is “almost guar-
anteed” and cite older publications on convicted offenders who have, 
usually anonymously, admitted to other offenses or have been convict-
ed of additional offenses while incarcerated. Indeed, the authors have 
seen exactly this “almost guaranteed” phrase employed on numerous 
occasions even in the complete absence of any interview or assessment 
of the alleged or convicted offender. The argument advanced by CPS 
workers to support this contention is based, inter alia, on the concept 
of “cross-over”; that is, the propensity of intrafamilial sexual offenders 
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to offend against different genders, children of different ages and non-
biological/biological children. 
While it is true that some intrafamilial sexual offenders are serial 
offenders, this is by no means the norm and such conclusions are 
drawn from studies of offenders with particular characteristics. For 
example, CPS workers frequently quote Studer et al. (2) in which it is 
reported that of 328 convicted sex offenders who participated in the 
study (150 were intrafamilial offenders) 22%—72—of the intrafamilial 
offenders claimed to have had other intrafamilial victims. The fact is, 
therefore, 78% were not convicted of intrafamilial child sexual abuse. 
Compared to the intrafamilial offenders, the inter-familial offenders’ 
rate of self-disclosure and/or proven convictions for other victims was 
12.9%. These results have, broadly speaking, been replicated in more 
recent studies (3-5). We want to point out that, in the above discus-
sion, the Queen’s logic exists in comparing apples (claiming to have) 
to oranges (not convicted of). 
Another significant contamination in the risk assessment literature 
concerned with calculating and yielding percentages of risk is the 
choice of terms such as “claims to (or known to) have done such and 
such” with which to determine the number of recidivists in the lot, 
versus counting the number in the developmental sample who were 
“not convicted of such and such” to represent non-recidivists. That 
lack of comparison alone (“claims to” versus “not convicted”) makes 
actual existing base rates the overwhelmingly most reliable basis on 
which to estimate the probability of recidivism. Said another way, the 
language of actuarial risk assessment itself is its own demise; the base 
rates of re-offense, whether defined by arrests, charges, convictions, or 
diversionary dispositions, is the most valid and reliable factor for esti-
mating the risk posed by an individual. 
Simply put, with the caveat that using disparate definitions makes 
findings of much of the research unreliable, depending on the study 
cited some 20-24% of offenders have reported after being convicted 
that they offended against children who were: of the opposite gender; 
10 / COYLE ET AL.: ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL DANGEROUSNESS 
different in terms of their biological relationships to the offender; or 
materially different in age range from their victim in the index offense 
for which they were convicted (3-5). It is critical to note, however, that 
all of these studies are based on the worst of the worst samples of sexu-
al offenders; typically, those being processed for civil commitment at 
the conclusion of their custodial sentences. That is, offenders who are 
being assessed under more or less parallel legislation in overseas juris-
dictions to the Queensland Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) 
Act 2003 (Sexually Violent Predator involuntary commitment legisla-
tion in the U.S.).  
Further, because incest is usually defined in the scientific literature 
as involving the extended family, including stepchildren, it is simply 
not possible to say with certainty what the percentage of cross-over 
offending from biological to non-biological children and vice versa 
really is. In fact, alternative terms used in the scientific literature, often 
seemingly coined ad hoc, to define intrafamilial offending as involving 
“related victims” can include the most minimal relationship by con-
sanguinity, such as non-blood related cousins. It seems obvious that 
sexual offending against a biological child and then progressing to of-
fending against a non-biological family member, including, say, a 
cousin, is vastly different than the obverse. This is a lacuna in the sci-
entific literature that does not appear to be addressed by most com-
mentators on this subject. Yet, because of differential degrees of inhibi-
tion, the cultural if not genetic imperative against incest, in the biolog-
ical sense of the word, is strong (6). Hence, it would be expected that 
progression from sexual offending against biological children to sexual 
offending against stepchildren/extended family members would be 
easier and occur much more often than the obverse.  
In another example of the Queen’s logic, on the basis of studies of 
demonstrably dangerous and/or serial offenders, the authors have seen 
CPS workers assert that the pattern of cross-over offenses so identified 
(i.e., in that population sample) proves that all intrafamilial offenders 
are at greater risk of reoffending when compared to other sexual of-
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fenders. This claim is not justified. Conclusions drawn from a set of 
data that is based on one type of offender (e.g., demonstrably danger-
ous) cannot be considered, ipso facto, to apply to any other type of of-
fender. Studies based on such retrospective data analysis also prove 
nothing: for those convicted of intrafamilial sexual abuse, the base rate 
of recidivism (the probability that any randomly selected intrafamilial 
sex offender will recidivate either generally or with respect to a specific 
offense within a defined time) is overwhelmingly more important in 
estimating future risk than is admission of prior offenses. Ignoring the 
effect of the base rate of the occurrence of any phenomena, as seems to 
occur routinely in these CPS cases, bedevils all areas of science (7-14).  
Ignoring the effect of the base rate on the probability of any event 
occurring is referred to as base rate neglect. This is a ubiquitous cogni-
tive heuristic that is inimical to proper assessment of the most reliable 
probability estimate of an event occurring. Ignoring or not mentioning 
base rate information has long been recognized as a fundamental 
problem leading to massive unreliability in the proffered estimate of 
risk, usually overestimation of the true probability of the occurrence of 
any event, such as recidivism in sexual offenders (11, 15). Neal and 
Grisso provide an example that neatly demonstrates base rate neglect:  
“For example, Casscells, Schoenberger, and Graboys (1978) 
asked Harvard Medical School faculty, staff, and 4th-year med-
ical students the following question: 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a 
false positive rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found 
to have a positive result actually has the disease, assuming that 
you know nothing about the person’s symptoms or signs? 
_____% 
The correct Bayesian answer under the most plausible interpre-
tation of the problem is about 2%. Specifically, 51 people out of 
1000 would test positive (1 true positive and 50 false positives). 
Of the 51 people with positive tests, 1 would actually have the 
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disease. Expressed as a proportion, this is 1/51 = 0.019 or 1.9%. 
But only 18% of the Harvard-affiliated participants had an an-
swer close to 2%. Forty-five percent of this distinguished group 
said the answer was 95%, thereby completely neglecting the 
base rate information” (11, page 203). 
Base rates of recidivism as measured by longitudinal studies after 
offenders have been convicted are not affected by admissions of prior 
offenses. It proceeds from this that the focus of CPS workers on the 
post-conviction findings of other sexual offenses by intrafamilial sexu-
al offenders has absolutely no relevance to the base rate of future of-
fenses. Base rates will remain unperturbed by ex post facto academic 
studies. However, when assessing the risk of recidivism, great mischief 
arises from conflating the results of studies measuring offenses occur-
ring prior to conviction with offenses reported and/or occurring post-
conviction.  
A further problem arises when relying on data obtained from con-
victed offenders while they are in a treatment programs. In such pro-
grams there is compelling pressure on offenders to acknowledge guilt 
because unless guilt is acknowledged they simply cannot progress to 
release. It has been demonstrated that, under such circumstances 
simply to get on with “treatment,” offenders will often admit to behav-
ior that is remote to the point of fantasy (16). Accordingly, considera-
ble skepticism is justified and necessary when the rate of crossover 
from one type of sex offense to other types is purported to have been 
identified in studies aimed at teasing out the relationships between 
variables related to intrafamilial offending. There is no reason to be-
lieve that recidivism rates based on that kind of research are reliable—
usually representing significant overestimates—and every reason to 
believe that they are unreliable. Conversely, offenders deny their of-
fenses with authority figures they do not trust but acknowledge them 
to those they do trust. Put this way, denial is not necessarily dichoto-
mous but may represent a continuum, such that exactly when minimi-
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zation of the severity of an offense becomes denial is a matter of con-
jecture.  
The fact that some 20-24% of the “worst of the worst” of intra-
familial sex offenders may demonstrate crossover has no bearing on 
the base rate of crossover occurring in the group of intrafamilial sexual 
offenders as a whole. One reasonable estimate of crossover offending is 
in the order of 5% over 5 years and 10% over 19 years (17). Yet, based 
on more recent data, those recidivism rates will significantly overesti-
mate the actual recidivism rate because, for one thing, they are based 
on outdated (1982-1992) longitudinal studies. It is well established that 
the base rate for sexual recidivism of all types has been declining pre-
cipitously (18, 19). Although the reasons are not fully understood, the 
base rate decline is up to 59% when comparing current samples on 
commonly used actuarial measures that are based on data that is more 
than 10 years old, such as the Static-99 in its various iterations, and 
other nomothetic tests employed to predict recidivism, such as the 
Risk Matrix-2000 (RSM-2000) (9, p. 274). 
Generally, the base rate for recidivism of all sexual offenders of the 
same age range as the offender in this case (he was 39 at the time of the 
application that is the subject of this article) is in the order of 7.6% ac-
cording to the age-stratified data provided by Wollert and colleagues 
(20). Their data are based on an eight-year follow-up sample of 9,305 
sexual offenders and are the most comprehensive and thoroughly ana-
lyzed, and include current data in which age stratification is included. 
However since the data on which this test (MATS-1) was developed 
involved longitudinal studies conducted over the past 17 years, it will 
also overestimate recidivism due to the falling rate of recidivism, at 
least among sexual offenders in first-world countries. Absolutely no 
mention was made of this seminal fact in the material contained in the 
affidavit filed by the applicant. 
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THE ACCURACY OF CHILD PROTECTION WORKERS’ JUDGMENTS 
Early studies demonstrated that “chance” was the mean accuracy 
of CPS workers in predicting future harm of all types. For example, 
Ruscio (21) in a review of studies evaluating the accuracy of CPS 
workers in determining whether to place children into foster care 
found that 48% of placements were unnecessary and 45% of children 
who should have been placed in foster were not. The criteria for mak-
ing these decisions were the identified presence, or absence, of mal-
treatment of one type or another. This finding has since been repeat-
edly demonstrated in numerous studies, most particularly with respect 
to CPS workers making judgments about abuse of whatever type. For 
example, Gambrill and Shlonsky (22) have argued that 22% to 42% 
percent of child protection cases are incorrectly classified vis-à-vis 
abuse. More recent studies involving assessment by CPS workers of 
putative sexual abuse (23, 24) have confirmed this pessimistic assess-
ment.  
In addition to base rate neglect, various biases affect the objective 
assessment of risk by CPS workers just as such biases affect all non-
empirically derived assessments (22, 25, 26). Other important biases in 
the forensic context are confirmatory bias (paying attention to things 
that confirm preexisting bias and/or an initial preconception while ig-
noring those things which disconfirm the bias and preconception) and 
overestimation bias, which is closely related to base rate neglect. The 
latter is routinely observed when the base rate of the occurrence of an 
event, in the cited case sexual recidivism, is low. In this situation CPS 
workers and mental health professionals involved in risk assessment of 
all disciplines routinely overestimate the likelihood of the event occur-
ring (27). In addition, numerous studies have demonstrated that, de-
spite the accuracy of decisions made by CPS workers being at chance 
level or, at best and only sometimes, accurate about 75% of the time, 
CPS workers express the utmost confidence in their judgments. Une-
quivocal evidence from empirical studies on CPS practice shows that 
such confidence is not related to performance (e.g., Regehr, et al. [24]). 
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A series of studies published in the social work domain have 
demonstrated that CPS workers routinely conflate their perceptions of 
accuracy of judgment with their personal convictions as to the accura-
cy of their judgments (22, 26, 28). Nowhere is this inflated and un-
founded confidence in their judgments more apparent than in intra-
familial child sexual abuse cases where blame is attributed to the non-
offending mother. In the Australian forensic context, Breckenridge 
and Baldry (29) reported that 61% of CPS workers felt that some 
mothers were aware of the abuse while 10% of CPS workers believed 
that the majority of mothers were aware of the abuse and did nothing 
(felt and believed being the operative concepts). There is absolutely no 
evidence to support these well-entrenched perceptions about what the 
mothers knew and to what degree what they knew or did not know 
contributes to reliable assessment of risk. Nonetheless, such conten-
tions continue, in one shape or form, to this day. In fact, it is well es-
tablished that up to 95% of mothers were not aware of the abuse prior 
to it being discovered by others (See, generally, Wilson, [1, 30]) 
The unwarranted confidence of CPS workers in the accuracy of 
their judgments vis-à-vis recidivism of intrafamilial sexual offenders is 
particularly inimical to objective risk assessment when CPS workers 
consider the involvement of the non-offending parent, overwhelming-
ly the mother. Seminally, Regehr et al. noted, “The perception that the 
mother denied or minimized the abuse increased the worker’s confi-
dence that the child was at risk” (24, p. 626). 
Despite this confidence, we could find not one single, reputable 
study in the entire scientific lexicon that supports this well-entrenched 
belief among CPS workers. What might explain this demonstrated la-
cuna in the knowledge of doubtless well-intentioned professionals? 
One obvious explanation for this ill-founded belief among CPS work-
ers and other professionals—and the public at large for that matter—
seems to be, first and foremost, the entrenched desire to protect chil-
dren. With that over-riding goal (i.e., always err on the side of cau-
tion), conflating the results of crossover offending among intrafamilial 
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child sex offenders with the base rate of recidivism in this group of of-
fenders follows almost organically. Another possible explanation in-
volves ignorance of the low base rate of recidivism of child sexual of-
fenders generally, leading to overestimation bias. Another explanation 
involves gross ignorance of fundamental statistical concepts that seem 
to bedevil professionals of all disciplines who make judgments about 
all types of recidivism. Nowhere is this lack of understanding of basic 
statistical concepts more important than in attempting to extrapolate 
from individual indicia that have been identified as being correlated to 
one degree or another with sex offense recidivism.  
DENIAL OF GUILT AND RECIDIVISM IN SEXUAL OFFENDERS 
Research into the importance of denial of guilt as a risk factor for 
sexual offense recidivism informs that it is not a significant predictor 
of sex offense recidivism and may even be negatively correlated with 
recidivism (31-33)—perhaps for the prosaic reason that those who 
most strongly deny their guilt are, in fact, innocent. Leaving putative 
innocence aside, it is critical to recognize that of all so-called risk fac-
tors, none, including base rate, which is the most reliable single predic-
tor, is so strongly correlated with recidivism that it can be considered a 
reliable or valid predictive factor in isolation from all other factors. In 
a seminal meta-analysis based on 28,972 sexual offenders, Hanson and 
Bussière (31) identified some 57 factors that correlate with recidivism 
in sexual offenders, denial of guilt being one of them. Save phallome-
tric measurement, which is impractical to employ in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, none of the factors emerging from their study corre-
lated more than 0.19 with recidivism. This means that the highest 
amount of the total variability accounted for by any one factor—
routinely considered to be the number of prior offenses—was only 
3.6%.1 Hanson and Bussière (31) obtained correlations between denial 
                                                
1 Technically this is referred to as the coefficient of determination. This is defined as 
1-minus the correlation coefficient squared, where +/-1 is defined as perfect correla-
tion. 
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and sex offender recidivism that ranged from -0.05 to 0.09 for a 95% 
confidence interval. In other words, denial may ever-so-slightly in-
crease or decrease recidivism and risk but we don’t know which.  
More recent studies have broadly confirmed these findings (32, 
33). With the exception of age at 65 years or older, the period in which 
the rate of sexual recidivism approaches zero, it is absurd to base a risk 
assessment overwhelmingly on any one factor, whatever that factor is.  
Acceptance of the offending partner’s denial of guilt was not identified 
in the meta-analyses of Hanson and Bussière (31) or Hanson and Mor-
ton-Bourgon (32, 33) as having any relationship to recidivism. No sub-
sequent comprehensive study has seriously challenged these findings.  
There is, to the authors’ knowledge, only one study that claims to 
show that denial predicts recidivism in any way (34). Nunes et al., 
claim to have demonstrated that with a total sample of 489 sex offend-
ers, of whom 244 were intrafamilial offenders, those who were assessed 
as low risk compared statistically to the group more likely to recidivate 
than those who were high risk. There are a number of compelling 
problems with this study that involve idiosyncratic and general epis-
temological issues that create a virtual checklist of factors appearing in 
risk assessment research that must be carefully analyzed before any 
degree of reliability or validity can be assigned to both its methodology 
and results. Even were the methodology and definitions acceptable, the 
effect reported in terms of relative difference amounts to only a 5% to 
10% absolute difference in recidivism rates of comparable populations 
of offenders.  
A TEMPLATE FOR ASSESSING RELIABILITY  
AND VALIDITY IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
We devote considerable space to analysis of the Nunes et al. (34) 
study, concluding that, whether taken in toto or each factor inde-
pendently, there are compelling grounds to be skeptical about this 
study if not reject it altogether. Hence, this study serves as a veritable 
template for assessing the reliability and validity of a study in risk as-
sessment.  
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The study’s authors state that, to their knowledge, the statistical 
analysis they employed has never, before or since, been employed in 
such a study. Indeed, those authors noted (p. 100) that the procedures 
they employed were so unusual that they were verified through “con-
sultation with an expert in medical statistics” who was anonymous, 
which further weakens the scientific underpinnings of the research. 
There is no evidence presented to show that the statistical methods 
employed comply with the mathematical assumptions necessary for 
applying interval level measurements to such small samples vis-à-vis 
some of the subgroups sampled.  
To compound the methodological errors, assessments of “low risk” 
and “high risk” were made using a “modified RRASOR”, which was 
not adequately described by the authors. In fact, it has never been ade-
quately described or subjected to peer review to the best of our 
knowledge. In addition, the authors relied upon psychometric tests for 
psychopathy (PCL-R) that have been completely discredited in pre-
dicting recidivism in any particular individual (9, 35, 36). Finally, in 
this study, confirmatory bias would be difficult, if possible, to control 
(37, 38). 
The Odds Ratio identified in this study is, at best, 2.9:1. Nunes and 
colleagues’ definition of the “odds ratio” is:  
“The odds ratio can be interpreted as an increase or decrease in 
the predicted odds of recidivism, or in the case of a dichoto-
mous predictor (e.g., denial) as the odds of recidivism in one 
group as compared to the other (e.g., denier vs. admitter). An 
odds ratio of 1.00 would reflect no relationship between the 
predictor and the outcome.” (34, page 96). 
It might seem that an Odds Ratio of 2.91 indicates that the deniers 
are 2.91 times more likely to recidivate,2 which would be wrong since it 
fails to take account of the underlying base rate of recidivism. Consid-
                                                
2 The Odds Ratio in not the same as the Risk Ratio. With low base rates the Risk Ra-
tio will overestimate, often significantly, the Odds Ratio. 
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ering a base rate of 8% (at the upper end of current base rate tallies) 
and applying Bayes’ Theorem, 3 it can be calculated that the probability 
of making a correct decision with a base rate of recidivism taking into 
account a test which has a demonstrated Odds Ratio of 2.91 is only 
0.15 (14). In other words, on the basis of their reported results, the 
probability of being correct in arguing the offender was likely to recid-
ivate because he denied guilt is only 15%. Generally a risk factor must 
have a very strong relative risk to be useful as a screening instrument 
at the individual level. To attain the minimum default scientific default 
standard of 95% accuracy (i.e. p=0.95), an Odds Ratio of 200:1 is need-
ed with such a low base rate according to some authors, although oth-
ers set the bar significantly lower (35, p. 261). 
The definition used for related victims is overly broad: “biological 
children, step-children, adopted children, nieces, nephews, cousins, 
grandchildren or siblings in their index offense” (34, p. 94). On this 
basis alone, the generalizability of this study vis-à-vis the probability of 
an offender convicted for sexually offending against a stepchild then 
recidivating against a biological child is called into serious question. 
The definition of “denial” includes those who partially denied their 
guilt. Since “partial deniers” are often simply minimizing the severity 
of their offense, the issue of the import of “denial” is hopelessly con-
founded (39, 40). 
The reported rate of recidivism in the group identified as “low 
risk” was, depending on which base rate data is relied upon, some four 
to six times that which would be expected of intrafamilial sex offenders 
as a group. Nunes et al. state specifically that:  
“Readers should be cautioned that the study intentionally over-
sampled recidivists and the proportion of sexual recidivists 
                                                
3 This is mathematically unassailable. As Wollert (14, p. 176) notes: “In general, 
Bayes’ Theorem (Bayes, 1764) is a tool for assessing the probability that a theory—for 
example, that a person with heart disease will die in 5 years—is true when considered 
in light of the diagnostic accuracy…of some piece of evidence, such as a disease crite-
rion or a test score, and what is known about the overall, or base rate, probability of 
the focal outcome.” 
20 / COYLE ET AL.: ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL DANGEROUSNESS 
(32.9%; 24/73) and would not be representative of any particu-
lar population [emphasis added]” (34, p. 99). 4 
On this basis alone, this study should not be relied upon to draw 
conclusions about the recidivism risk of sexual offenders in the instant 
case or for the overwhelming majority of sexual offenders as the base 
rate of sex offense recidivism is four times lower than the rate reported 
in this study.  
THE (LACK OF) REPLICABILITY CRISIS IN SCIENCE 
The abject failure to systematically analyze the manifest failings of 
this research by any of those who have cited the Nunes et al. (34) study 
illustrates a number of insidious, poorly understood and ubiquitous 
problems in science generally and forensic science in particular. It may 
fairly be regarded as an outlier in statistical terms; that is, a result so 
unusual that it should not be relied upon without replication; an issue 
directly addressed by the authors’ explicit caution as to the limitations 
of their study. It is therefore alarming that recent studies in related ar-
eas by Australian forensic psychologists with considerable experience 
are silent on this point (41). They are not alone in this. At the time of 
writing this article, we found no evidence that any of the 64 studies 
that have cited Nunes et al. (34) has properly considered the profound 
methodological limitations of this study that proceed as an inevitable 
consequence of the intentional oversampling, nor its other methodo-
logical failings. It is tempting to write this off as inadequate attention 
to methodological and professional detail, as was evidenced by the 
psychologist in the instant case opening his interview/examination of 
the offender’s spouse with the picture of copulating kangaroos. How-
ever, writing off inadequate analysis as “inadequate attention” would 
be a mistake as not one of the studies citing this article with approba-
                                                
4 Thus, the sample size of recidivists classified as “low risk” that recidivated was 
only 23, according to the authors. This is an abysmally low sample size on which to 
seek to overturn empirical evidence based on over thirty thousand sexual offenders 
who have been the subject of major, long-term, studies. See, generally, Hanson and 
Bussière (31) and Hanson and Morton-Bourgon (32, 33).  
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tion has addressed the more fundamental problems with replication. 
This is a pan-global problem for science (42, 43). Amazingly few jour-
nals printing psychological and/or risk assessment issues publish repli-
cation studies; most want only “original” work. Without confirming 
replication studies, however, all such research and theory are merely 
exploratory and cannot be considered valid as courtroom evidence. 
The value of direct replication has been at the forefront of recent 
scientific debate that contends that the credibility of research in the 
behavioral and social sciences is compromised by a culture of enquiry 
that promotes inflated effects and false-positive errors (44, 45). Sys-
tematic reforms in scientific practice are advocated on the basis that 
science’s hallmark function of self-correction is undermined by devia-
tions from the truth-seeking principle (45, 46). Ioannidis’ summation 
best describes this predicament:   
“In the absence of replication efforts, one is left with uncon-
firmed (genuine) discoveries and unchallenged fallacies, where 
in many areas of psychological science, perpetuated and un-
challenged fallacies may compromise the majority of the circu-
lating evidence” (45, p. 645). 
Pashler and Harris (46), for one source, contend that psychological 
science is facing a “replicability crisis” such that it won’t necessarily 
correct itself unless direct (not just conceptual) replications are per-
formed. Ioannidis (45) contends that the focus of scientific research 
needs to shift from discovering something “novel and significant to 
getting to the truth” (p. 648). Ioannidis (45), reported that, in a series 
of papers published in the well–regarded journal Perspectives on Psy-
chological Science, the prevalence of replication studies performed fol-
lowing “positive” findings was very low—in the order of 1-5%. Makel 
and colleagues (47) noted that replications in psychological science are 
“extremely uncommon.”  
More alarmingly, Pashler and Harris (46) have demonstrated that 
with an underlying base rate of 10%, which is a reasonable maximum 
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to apply for all sex offenders, and statistical power of 80%, which 
grossly overestimates the power of all techniques used to determine 
recidivism in sexual offenders, the proportion of studies yielding true 
positives will still be a mere 8%, while the proportion yielding false 
positives will be 36%. It is not until the underlying base rate, or prior 
probability, reaches 75% that, with a statistical power of 35%, false pos-
itives drop to the default position in science of 5%. An underlying base 
rate of 75% is never achieved even with the “worst of the worst” of 
sexual offenders. It is hard to think of any phenomena in forensic psy-
chology specifically or psychology in general where the underlying 
base rate is 75% except for blinding obvious phenomena such as right-
handedness (technically referred to as right-laterality). The conse-
quences of ignoring base rates described by Neal and Grisso (11), is 
useful to keep in mind when considering these findings. 
The obverse side of this problem is subtler: the prospect of false 
negative findings occurring as a result of poorly framed hypotheses 
and poor experimental design (44). While this is important, given the 
demonstrated bias against publication of negative findings, this prob-
lem is clearly the lesser of two evils.  
OBJECTIVE METHODS OF RISK ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 
Levenson and Morin (48, p. 76), noting that “perpetrator factors 
related to the risk of repeat sex offending have been virtually ignored 
in the development of CPS risk assessment protocols,” proposed that 
risk assessment of future child sexual abuse can be improved using 
“empirically derived risk models.” The difficulty here is that the epis-
temological and statistical principles underlying risk assess-
ment/management of sexual offenders are exceedingly complex but 
CPS workers with a social work background who encompass a signifi-
cant proportion if not the overwhelming majority of such individuals 
simply do not have the training in epistemology and statistics to un-
derstand the limitations of many empirically derived risk models. Un-
fortunately, it is not just social workers that lack this training. It goes 
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not too far to say that there is no evidence that the majority of forensic 
psychologists in Australia or those in the U.S. serving as expert wit-
nesses in sexually violent predator commitment comprehend all the 
issues that must be considered to form reasoned judgment in such 
matters. Cooke and Michie (15) contend that ignorance of Bayes The-
ory and the limitations of relying on the omnibus statistic the Area 
Under the Curve (AUC) derived from Receiver Operating Characteris-
tic (ROC) analysis is rife among forensic psychologists. They are not 
alone in making these observations (9, 10). 
ESTIMATING RISK: TRAPPED IN A CORNER WITHOUT OUR “BASE RATES” 
The continuing decades-long line of research into the issue of how 
well the clinical judgment in a variety of professions accurately predict 
recidivism repeatedly found it to be no better than chance (9, 49, 50). 
An equally bald fact is that empirically derived risk models have poor 
predictive accuracy when applied to individuals (35, 51). As far as 
nomothetic or actuarial risk assessment instruments (ARAIs) are con-
cerned, it is absolutely unequivocal that they almost never meet the 
legal test of the Balance of Probabilities let alone Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt. Coyle and Halon (10) provide a fuller explanation of scientific 
and legal standards of proof in the context of ARAIs. 
As Cooke and Michie (15) pithily note in discussing the predictive 
accuracy of the Risk Management 2000 (RM2000), an ARAI designed 
to predict violent and sexual recidivism:  
“The prediction based on the RM2000s that a Very High Risk 
offender will reoffend will be wrong 93% of the time; predic-
tions that an offender in either the Very High Risk or the High 
Risk groups will reoffend will be wrong 96% of the time. The 
numbers necessary to detain in order to prevent one instance 
of recidivism are large.” 
Relatedly, with respect to the most frequently employed ARAI, the 
Static-99 in its various iterations, Campbell and De Clue (8) have 
demonstrated that at the usual cut-off score employed on this test 
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(>6/13), it is necessary to detain 6 individuals to prevent one instance 
of recidivism. Conversely, some 18 individuals judged to be at below 
this cut-off score (<6/13) could be safely released without one instance 
of recidivism. Considering that one point scoring variations between 
different assessors on the Static-99 occur some 45% of the time (52), 
the jurisprudence implications of these statistics are clear and pro-
found.  
Cooke and Michie (15) draw a bleak conclusion when evaluating 
the overall utility of ARAIs in predicting sexual recidivism:  
“Given the perceived crisis of replication in our field, and the 
frequent failure of science to be “self-correcting” (Ioannidis, 
2012), their prescription for ethical practice should, in our 
view, be applied—and soon—to the area of violence risk. 
Menken famously remarked ‘There is always an easy solution 
to every human problem—neat, plausible and wrong.’ Sexual 
violence is a complex human problem, ARAIs may, to some, 
appear to be both neat and plausible, but unfortunately, they 
are wrong—and dangerously so.” 
There is an important caveat to the conclusions of Cooke and 
Michie as to the utility of ARAIs in meeting legal standards of proof 
although not in a way intended by the developers and proponents of 
ARIAs. If we ask “How useful are ARIAs for ruling out recidivism” the 
answer is illuminating. For example, assuming a Static-99R score of 6 
and using the Routine group of offenders for comparison purposes, 
ruling out recidivism risk will result in being correct 95% of the time; 
19 offenders scoring 6 or below can be released and only one of them 
will commit a new sexual offense. Therefore the accuracy of the Static-
99R used correctly, that is, for “ruling out” recidivism is rather impres-
sive. In a similar vein, Cooke and Michie noted with respect to the 
RM-2000:  
“It should perhaps be noted in passing that 98% accuracy in the 
prediction of proven sexual reoffending can be easily achieved 
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with their data—by predicting everyone will fail to reoffend (i.e., 
977/1,000) [emphasis added]” (15, p. 50). 
What then is to be made of the adamantine opinions of CPS work-
ers that recidivism is almost guaranteed in cases such as the matter 
discussed here? Outright skepticism if not immediate rejection of all 
assertions that are completely unsupported by objective, scientific evi-
dence springs to mind. More fundamentally, the problem that judicial 
officers face in making a decision inevitably involves consideration of 
the gravity of harm that might proceed if a false negative error is made; 
conflation of risk with potential gravity of harm is an ever-present re-
ality in sex abuse cases. In theory, predicting the future with respect to 
recidivism of any type requires an assessment to be made inde-
pendently of the restrictions that might be applied to offenders on the 
basis that they might reoffend. However, in practice, these decisions 
are not independent.  
THE CALCULUS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
In a study with 153 real jurors who were post-polled with regard to 
the interaction between the probability of offending and an assessment 
of risk of recidivism the conflation of these two factors was most clear-
ly demonstrated:  
“Most jurors (81.7%) considered a 15% estimated chance of re-
cidivism to mean that the respondent was “likely” to reoffend, 
and many (53.6%) even considered a 1% chance to indicate 
likely reoffense. Jurors who heard lower risk estimates in trials 
were more likely to report that a low chance of recidivism (as 
low as 1%) indicated an offender was likely to reoffend” (53, p. 
293). 
Simply put, jurors view risk more in terms of the severity of poten-
tial harm than in terms of statistical probability; which, of course, they 
cannot be expected to understand well enough. Given discretion to 
define tolerable risk, jurors consider even a statistically low degree of 
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risk intolerable. The difficulty here is patent. The threshold for making 
decisions in child protection matters is not clear. Hence, CPS workers 
are free to set whatever thresholds they choose. For example, if the 
base rate of recidivism over five years is 8% and CPS workers regard a 
risk of 1% as being unacceptable then the laws designed to protect 
children from sexual offenders no longer serve their original purpose 
of identifying “likely” offenders. 
Are judges also likely to conflate the risk of recidivism with the 
gravity of harm? There is only one study that has addressed this point. 
Monahan and Silver (54) found that a 26% perceived likelihood by ju-
dicial officers that a patient would commit a violent crime was, on av-
erage, sufficient to justify civil commitment; a terminology employed 
in the U.S. to mean preventive detention. Eleven percent of judges 
would order commitment for a patient who presented a 1% risk of 
committing a violent act; 38.5% of judges would order commitment 
with an 8% risk; 23.1% would order commitment with a 26% risk; and 
26.9% of judges would order commitment with a 56% risk. These fig-
ures bear comparison to those reported for jurors. Clearly, the judges 
in the singular study reported are less likely to conflate risk and the 
gravity of harm, but they do integrate the two factors into their calcu-
lus of risk. Whether these findings hold true for other jurisdictions is a 
live issue but it is simply foolish to think that judicial officers are im-
mune to the cognitive biases and cognitive heuristics that influence 
decision making in other people, no matter how diligently they seek to 
apply the law; especially since, like laypersons, they typically do not 
understand the statistics or the methodology of risk assessment. In any 
event, the law is hopelessly muddled as to what is the standard of proof 
in the various states and territories in Australia and in other countries 
that have enacted preventive detention legislation and with respect to 
parole decisions and associated child protection legislation (9). The 
interrelationship between the risk of harm and the gravity of harm in 
assessing risk is rarely discussed yet it is of seminal import. 
 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, VOLUME 34, ISSUE 1, 2016 / 27 
 
As Coyle and Halon note:  
“Either wittingly or unwittingly, the various state legislation in 
Australia encompasses this issue by reference to the concept of 
an unacceptable risk to the community should SVP offenders 
who are considered to pose a serious risk of dangerousness be 
released. It seems that exactly the same thing happens in indi-
vidual cases in the USA as a result of the tendency of the triers 
of fact to err on the side of ‘caution,’ although erring on the 
side of not making a False Negative decision is a better way of 
putting it. Certainly, the experience in Minnesota in the USA 
where only one SVP offender preventively detained has been 
released in the last 23 years speaks to this” (10, p. 221). 
Exactly the same conflation between assessing the probability of an 
event occurring and the consequences of that event occurring obtains 
when considering matters such as the instant case, child protection 
matters and parole matters generally. 
ALLEGIANCE EFFECTS 
The problem of forensic evaluators scoring risk assessment in-
struments differently in the field (as opposed to laboratories) encom-
passes different types of error. One error is due to evaluator differ-
ences, which may be attributable to training effects and inherent diffi-
culties in interpreting risk assessment instruments. Boccaccini et al. 
summarize this situation thusly:  
“When forensic evaluators assign scores to offenders on a risk 
assessment instrument, we assume that the offenders receive 
different scores because they differ on the trait measured by the 
instrument. At the same time, we know that it is impossible to 
measure any trait or behavior perfectly and that any score an 
evaluator assigns to any offender is a product of both the of-
fender’s true level of the trait and at least some measurement 
error” (55, p. 337). 
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A second type of error is allegiance bias, which is not always due to 
a systematic and deliberate attempt to score an instrument or push a 
clinical interview in one direction or the other. The potential for alle-
giance bias has long been recognized and has led to a not unreasonable 
skepticism of the role of expert witnesses within the legal system. This 
was most famously commented on by Sir George Jessel, the Master of 
the Rolls, in Lord Arbinger v. Ashton, in 1873:  
“In matters of opinion I very much distrust expert evidence, for 
several reasons…An expert is not like an ordinary witness, who 
hopes to get his expenses, but he is employed by the person 
who calls him. Now it is natural that his mind, however honest 
he may be, should be biased in favour of the person employing 
him and accordingly we do find such bias...undoubtedly there is 
a natural bias to do something serviceable to those who employ 
you and adequately remunerate you [emphasis added]” (56, p. 
374). 
There is no evidence that we know of to suggest that human nature 
has changed so much (if at all) that we are no longer affected by this 
bias. There is no evidence that allegiance bias is not as alive and well in 
the 21st century as it was in the 19th. A series of studies conducted by 
Murrie and colleagues (57-59) has confirmed this. Most of this effect is 
clearly not conscious and systematic bias, just as Sir George Jessel not-
ed. 
A third source of error is systematic bias: more correctly called sci-
entific fraud. In the U.S., this has been unequivocally proven with re-
spect to a number of ostensibly highly qualified experts retained by the 
organs of the state to independently assess sex offenders for civil 
commitment. Some consistently find, in the absence of cogent evi-
dence to support their conclusions, that 98-99% of those they assess 
should be preventively detained (60). Discombobulating though this 
may be for judicial officers, it is a problem that infects the curial pro-
cess most clearly when it comes to risk assessment of future events.  
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Whatever the motivation of these psychologists, one thing is clear: 
this sort of behavior brings the problem of allegiance bias, if not fraud, 
to the front and center stage of risk assessment. Ultimately, in the case 
we have described, the weight of expert opinion overcame the precon-
ceptions of the psychologist retained by CSS. It is rare for respondents 
to be able to afford the expert assistance required in this matter and 
the result could easily have been different.  
CONCLUSIONS 
According to standard concepts of jurisprudence in those jurisdic-
tions that have embraced the common law, the law is not concerned 
with cost-benefit analysis. It is not even directly concerned with jus-
tice. The law is concerned with the application of legal principals and 
concepts that, in theory, will result in justice more often than not. It is 
hoped that by adhering to legal principles and concepts justice will be 
delivered with a high degree of confidence. However, nowhere in any 
common law jurisdiction is this quantified for any particular case. Nor 
can it be: the myriad facts that each case presents preclude that pro-
spect.  
The law guarantees that a decision will be made but it does not 
guarantee outcomes. Yet an outcome is precisely what the law seeks to 
require of those engaging in the task of risk-analysis of dangerousness. 
Estimates derived from any currently available empirical measures 
cannot predict the future behavior of individuals with anything ap-
proaching that implicit in even the minimum legal standards of proof. 
Estimates of absolute and relative accuracy in risk assessments derived 
from ARAIs give the impression of scientific accuracy that is simply 
not warranted. It is arrant nonsense to assert otherwise, unless, like 
Humpty Dumpty, when we use a word it means what we want it to 
mean. 
In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, such as in 
those very rare cases where volitional control is absent or other com-
pelling clinical considerations such as antidepressant-induced hypo-
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mania obtain (see, for example: Coyle [9], p. 274-275), it is simply silly 
for anyone to assert that the risk of recidivism in sex offenders is all 
but guaranteed. Parenthetically it might be noted that CPS workers 
trained as social workers cannot make clinical judgments in Australia. 
While clinical social workers in the U.S. are trained to make diagnoses 
and form clinical opinions, most social workers we have encountered 
do not have the training to enable them to form clinical opinions and 
make diagnoses, although there is a danger that they may think they 
do. Although they are no doubt tempted by the siren song that “it is 
better to be safe than sorry,” recommending putting or keeping a fa-
ther out of the home tears apart the supportive fabric of the family. In 
turn, the level of social support available to family members is severely 
compromised with the result that mood disorders and other psycho-
logical ills multiply (61). Keeping families apart should not be enter-
tained unless cogent evidence is available. In a related context, it is so-
bering to note that when the Dangerous Prisoners Sexual Offender Act 
was mooted in Queensland it was estimated that only 10 offenders 
would be likely to be subject to its provisions and incarcerated at any 
one time. There are now some 220 individuals preventively detained 
under this legislation.  
POSTSCRIPT 
Ultimately the applicant (CPS) withdrew from the case after fur-
ther expert reports were served. The offender was allowed to reside 
with his wife and children. He has not recidivated and his children and 
his business have prospered. At the discretion of the Queensland Po-
lice he no longer has to report his whereabouts and the like pursuant 
to the relevant legislation.  
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